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GOVERNANCE IN THE EU
AFTER THE CRISIS
MARCO BUTI*
The EU's response to the crisis: an overview
The recent financial and economic crisis is the largest
economic shock to hit Europe since the Great
Depression of the 1930s. It has caused dramatic loss-
es in output and employment, and eroded the sustain-
ability of public finances in a number of EU member
states (see Table 1). The crisis has had a strikingly dif-
ferentiated impact on individual EU countries, which
was linked to a number of reasons.1 One of the most
prominent ones was the accumulation of increasingly
large macroeconomic imbalances and expansion in
competitiveness divergences in the pre-crisis period.
The unwinding of these imbalances, particularly in
the euro area, then contributed to the gravity and
propagation of the crisis in a number of member
states by deepening the contraction as well as aggra-
vating the situation of public finances.
The speed and scale of the crisis took all countries
and international organisations by surprise. The EU
has nonetheless responded in a coordinated and com-
prehensive manner. The primary aim was to ensure
financial stability and deal with the impact of the
recession. In the early stages, the focus invariably 
was more of a crisis management nature. Action 
was taken to stabilize the finan-
cial system and its institutions.
Thanks to resolute policy reac-
tions, including expansionary
monetary and fiscal policies, fi  -
nancial meltdown was avoided
and the output losses were rela-
tively limited in a historical perspective and given the
scale of the crisis.
Over time, the focus of policy action has shifted to
measures to address the long-run consequences of the
crisis on growth and fiscal sustainability and policies
to prevent future reoccurrences. The EU now has
developed, and is implementing, a comprehensive
response to the crisis spanning virtually all realms of
economic and financial policy. In terms of its breadth,
ambition and state of advancement, it compares very
favourably with other countries around the world. 
The main logic behind this approach is governed by
the need to address a triplet of mutually intertwined
objectives: (i) to successfully accomplish the financial
repair and fix the regulatory weaknesses in the finan-
cial system; (ii) to proceed with fiscal consolidation
and put the strained public finances back on sustain-
able paths; and (iii) to boost growth and competitive-
ness in the EU in order to alleviate the necessary
adjustment and limit the long-run costs of the reces-
sion. To achieve these objectives, this approach com-
bines the following main elements (see Figure 1):
￿ Policies to restore health and stability of the banking
and financial systems. These include an overhaul of
regulatory framework for financial services2 and the
establishment in November 2010 of a new frame-
work for the surveillance of systemic macro and
micro financial risks through the European
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* European Commission.
1 For a thorough discussion of the causes
and impact of the crisis in the EU – see
European Commission (2009).
Table 1 
Impact of the crisis on key macroeconomic variables in the EU 
 2005–07  2008–10  2011–12* 
GDP growth rate (%)  2.7  – 0.6  1.9 
Per capita GDP growth rate (%)  2.3  – 1.0  1.6 
Unemployment rate (%)  8.1  8.6  9.3 
Government debt (% of GDP)  61.1  72.3  82.8 
Note: * ECFIN 2011 Spring Forecast. 
Source: European Commission. 
2 This overhaul of the supervisory framework is complemented by
improvements in the financial regulatory environment, including for
banks, hedge funds and credit rating agencies, by the development of
crisis resolution mechanisms for banks and by improvements in con-
sumer protection.Systemic Risk Board (ESRB)
and three European Super  -
visory Authorities.
￿ Support mechanisms for vulner-
able countries. As the crisis
revealed important vulnerabili-
ties in several EU member
states, specific support has
been provided to them in order
to help them withstand market
pressures and implement ap  -
pro  priate policies to regain
confidence. While these vulner-
abilities were of differing
nature, external and internal
im  balances were a critical fac-
tor and magnified the impact
of the crisis. While these vulnerabilities were of dif-
fering nature, external and internal imbalances were
a critical factor and magnified the impact of the cri-
sis. Several non-euro area countries – Hungary,
Latvia and Romania – have benefitted from Balance
of Payments (BoP) assistance in recent years and
the size of the BoP Facility was increased from
12 billion euros to 50 billion euros in 2009. In
response to the fiscal crisis in Greece in May 2010,
the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)
and European Financial Sta  bilisation Mechanism
(EFSM) were established for euro area countries up
until 2013, and additional programmes are now also
in place for Ireland, Portugal and Greece. The
European Council of 24/25 March 2011 has agreed
a permanent crisis resolution tool entitled the
European Stability Mechanism (ESM).
￿ The Europe 2020 strategy to raise growth and jobs
embedded in a European semester. Surveillance
under Europe 2020 will focus on promoting struc-
tural reforms to remove the most important bottle-
necks to sustainable growth from member state per-
spectives. The Community dimension is also a key
component, with the European Council setting five
headline targets for the Union to achieve by 2020,
and agreeing detailed work programmes in seven
flagship initiatives.3 Moreover, the organisation of
economic surveillance has been adapted to fit a
European semester approach with two key features.
First, surveillance of fiscal policy under the Stability
and Growth Pact (SGP), on macroeconomic imbal-
ances under a new Excessive Imbalances Procedure
(EIP) and on growth/jobs under the Europe 2020
strategy are to be aligned in time to take account of
policy interlinkages. Secondly, the European
Council will agree policy orientations in spring each
year to provide ex ante policy guidance in relation to
the national budget cycle so as to strengthen policy
synergies and avoid policy inconsistencies. The Euro
Plus Pact, agreed by the European Council in
March 2011 underlines the enhanced role which 
the European Council intends to play in shaping
economic policy priorities and ensuring follow-
up implementation.4 These innovations should cre-
ate conditions for achieving simultaneous progress
on fiscal consolidation and enhancing growth
potential. 
￿ Establishing a new system of economic governance in
EMU. The economic crisis revealed stark short-
comings in the approach to economic policy coor-
dination in the EU. Systemic improvements in the
conduct of policy coordination and enforcement of
rules are crucial to proceed with the necessary con-
solidation of public while ensuring balanced
growth and smooth adjustment to (idiosyncratic)
shocks. In September 2010, the Commission pre-
sented six new legislative proposals to strengthen
economic governance. It includes proposals to
strengthen the preventive and corrective arm of the
SGP (inter alia to allow for a more graduated
approach to the imposition of financial sanctions
earlier on in the procedure), the creation of a new
EIP including the possibility to impose sanctions
for euro area countries and a proposal for a Council
Directive on requirements for budgetary frame-
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￿Balance of Payments Facility
OVERVIEW OF THE EU'S RESPONCE TO THE CRISIS
Source: European Commission.
Figure 1
3 ‘A digital agenda for Europe’, ‘Youth on the Move’, ‘Innovation
Union’, ‘An industrial policy for the globalisation era’, ‘An agenda for
new skills and jobs’, ‘European platform against poverty’ and
‘Resource-efficient Europe’.
4 In the ‘Euro Plus Pact’, euro area member states and others on a
voluntary basis (Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania) will pursue the following objectives: (i) foster competitive-
ness; (ii) foster employment; (iii) contribute further to the sustain-
ability of public finances; and (iv) reinforce financial stability.CESifo Forum 2/2011 5
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works of the member states.
There is broad consensus on
the substantive elements of
these proposals shared by the
Council and Euro  pean Parlia  -
ment.5 At the time of writing,
the legislative proposals were
taking final shape in trilogues
involving these two institu-
tions as well as the European
Commission. The aim is to
achieve final adoption in June
2011.
The remainder of this article
focuses on one of the most impor-
tant and innovative parts of the
governance proposals: the proce-
dure to monitor and correct macroeconomic imbal-
ances. This proposal stems from a widespread recogni-
tion of the role macroeconomic imbalances and com-
petitiveness divergences played in increasing vulnerabil-
ity of the most exposed EU countries and the huge
costs associated with their disorderly unwinding. The
second section below examines the evolution of macro-
economic imbalances and provides the rationale for a
new and dedicated surveillance procedure. The third
section then describes the main features of the
Commission’s proposal. 
Macroeconomic imbalances before, during and 
after the crisis
In the decade preceding the crisis, macroeconomic
imbalances in the EU and within the euro area
increased considerably (European Commission
2010a). The warning signs were that current accounts
of some member states increased to staggering deficits
while for others current account surpluses built up
(Figure 2). External imbalances can be problematic
but not necessarily worrisome if deficits/surpluses are
natural responses to changes in underlying fundamen-
tals and the related saving and investment decisions of
households or businesses. For instance, countries in
the catching up phases often run current account
deficits by investing in building up the stock of pro-
ductive capacity. This, in turn, increases the prospects
of future income and ensures their ability to repay the
borrowed capital. Similarly, countries with ageing
population may find it opportune to save today, i.e.
run current account surpluses, to avoid a drop in con-
sumption in the future (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996). 
However, high and persistent current account imbal-
ances pose a policy challenge and need to be tackled
if they are driven by market failures or inappropriate
policy interventions. In this respect, external imbal-
ances might reflect other types of imbalances such as
excessive credit expansions or asset bubbles. In these
cases, the capital imported is not invested in produc-
tive activities that would enable the future repayment
of today’s incurred liabilities. Current account posi-
tions can also be a sign of an imbalance if they reflect
weaknesses in domestic demand.
Indeed, the growing imbalances in the EU and partic-
ularly in the euro area reflected, at least in part, unsus-
tainable macroeconomic developments. Some mem-
ber states saw their price and cost competitiveness
improve markedly, while others significantly lost com-
petitiveness. Price and cost competitiveness indica-
tors, such as Real Effective Exchange Rates, clearly
document the increasing divergences in the EU and
euro area (Figure 3). In addition, some euro area
countries have shown a worrying gradual deteriora-
tion in export market shares. 
The growing external imbalances were reflected in a
build-up of domestic imbalances such as excessive
credit growth in the private sector, housing imbal-
ances as well as structural weaknesses of domestic
demand and the inappropriate adjustments of wages
to a slowdown in productivity. In particular, countries






























CURRENT ACCOUNT: SURPLUS VS. DEFICIT MEMBER STATES
% of GDP
Surplus countries: BE, DK, DE, LU, NL, AT, FI and SE
Deficit countries: the rest of the EU  (a) ECFIN Spring Forecast 
Figure 2
5 See, for example, the report ‘Strengthening Economic Governance in
the EU’ of the Taskforce chaired by the European Council President
Herman Van Rompuy and the reports prepared by the rapporteurs in
the European Parliament, i.e. the Ferreira and Haglund reports.fast rates of growth which were to an important
degree driven by domestic demand booms and expan-
sions in non-tradable sectors, notably, albeit not
exclusively, construction. 
As a result of this process, fuelled by low financing
costs and increase in cross-border capital flow,
resources were often channelled into unproductive
uses. Figure 4 shows that the excessive credit expan-
sions stimulated demand and pushed current account
into deep deficits in some member states. Similarly,
housing prices grew fast in many EU countries, in sev-
eral cases developing into housing bubbles. Con  -
versely, domestic demand in other member states
appears to have been constrained, in part, due to
existing rigidities in product markets. This, together
with mispricing of risk in financial markets, resulted
in increasing current account sur-
pluses. 
The excess savings of surplus
countries tended to mirror the
negative savings of deficit coun-
tries in the years preceding the
crisis. This can be related to the
increased level of financial inte-
gration within the EU, the ‘euro
area bias’ in capital flows and the
fact that capital was flowing
‘downhill’, i.e. from richer to
catching up countries.6 The rapid
convergence in nominal interest
rates in future euro area members
is likely to have played an impor-
tant role in this process and has
initiated opposing adjustments in capital stocks. In
particular, euro area members which benefited the
most from the reduction in capital costs also experi-
enced the strongest deterioration in current accounts.
When the crisis struck, the existence of large imbal-
ances proved highly damaging to the EU economies.
The recession has brought about some correction in
external positions but the adjustment has been very
painful, especially for countries with high deficits.
Figure 5 documents that changes in external positions,
i.e. current account or trade balances, are driven by
developments in domestic demand, particularly in the
euro area. The economy with the largest contraction of
domestic demand during 2009–2011, Ireland, is also
the one with the largest correction of the trade balance.
Only a few countries managed to increase their trade
balance without such movements
of domestic demand. The adjust-
ment process has also been associ-
ated in a number of EU members
with a massive rise in unemploy-
ment which may indicate insuf-
ficient price/wage adjustment.
Corres pon ding ly,  there  is  limited
adjustment in competitiveness
positions.
It is also instructive to look at the
sectoral composition of imbal-
ances. It was mainly private sec-
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EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL IMBALNCES BEFORE THE CRISIS


























Current account as % of GDP (average 2000–07) 
Figure 4
6 The role of financial market integration
and the ‘euro’ bias has been documented
by a number of studies. Among some are
Berger and Nitsch (2010) and Balli et al.
(2010).CESifo Forum 2/2011 7
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tor balances which were driving
the divergence in external posi-
tions before the crisis erupted
(Figures 6 and 7). While in sur-
plus countries the financial bal-
ance of the private sector on aver-
age improved, in deficit countries
it progressively deteriorated up to
2007. Although government sec-
tor balances were largely positive
in surplus countries and the
opposite was the case in deficit
countries, their contribution to
overall imbalances was generally
more limited. The rebalancing in
deficit countries came through
sharp balance sheet adjustments
in the private sector, while the
already negative government sec-
tor balances deepened further
due to counter-cyclical fiscal
expansions. In surplus countries,
the government sector balances
also turned negative while private
sector balances moved further in
the positive territory on account
of balance sheet repair, albeit its
extent is considerably more limit-
ed than in deficit countries.
The unwinding of external and
internal imbalances has also had
adverse implications for public
finances, particularly in countries
with excessive private debt levels
(Figure 8). Implicit or explicit
government guarantees for the
troubled banking sector resulted
in the transfer of risk from pri-
vate to public sector. Addition  -
ally, sharp contractions in the
overblown sectors, e.g. construc-
tion, and the related increases in
unemployment contributed to
the deterioration of public fi  -
nances through fall-outs in tax
revenues and increased unem-
ployment support.
While having shrunk, external
imbalances have not vanished
altogether. Except for Ireland
and Estonia, current accounts are
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CHANGES IN DOMESTIC DEMAND AND TRADE BALANCE
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SAVING MINUS INVESTMENT: DEFICIT MEMBER STATES
% of GDP
Surplus countries: BE, DK, DE, LU, NL, AT, FI and SE 
Deficit countries: the rest of the EU 
Source: European Commission.
Data for 2011 and 2012 















SAVING MINUS INVESTMENT: SURPLUS MEMBER STATES
% of GDP
Surplus countries: BE, DK, DE, LU, NL, AT, FI and SE 
Deficit countries: the rest of the EU  
Data for 2011 and 2012 
are based on ECFIN Spring Forecast
Figure 6coming years, including for countries that have been
experiencing more moderate deficits such as France
or Italy. Among the surplus countries, current
account surpluses are not projected to fall subs  -
tantially. 
Looking forward, a key question is whether the
recorded reductions in external imbalances have been
cyclical or structural. In the latter case, imbalances
could widen again in the upswing. The weak
price/cost reactions experienced so far might indicate
that more structural adjustment is needed. Further
adjustments are thus more likely to come from domes-
tic demand contractions than export increases given
the weak cost corrections observed and the experience
with adjustments so far. 
Despite the rebalancing in the
current account positions, the
accumulated external liabilities
of the deficit countries are sub-
stantial and point to the need for
further adjustment. The stock
counterparts of current account
positions, the Net International
Investment Positions (NIIP),
have been gradually increasing,
reflecting the large accumulation
of debt that many countries expe-
rienced before the crisis (Fi  -
gure 9). Moreover, the NIIP as a
share of GDP further deteriorat-
ed in a number of EU deficit
countries in 2009, despite im  -
provements in current accounts,
on account of weak growth dy  -
namics.7
Enhanced surveillance and 
macroeconomic imbalances
Today, it is relatively straightfor-
ward to see that in the years pre-
ceding the crisis, low financing costs and other factors
fuelled misallocation of resources, often to less pro-
ductive uses, feeding unsustainable levels of consump-
tion, housing bubbles and accumulation of external
and internal debt. Indeed, previous Commission
analysis did identify imbalances in several areas of the
EU economies.8 However, at the time, the policy dis-
cussions and responses were not systematic and
lacked teeth. 
To remedy this, the European Commission proposed
to establish a procedure to prevent and correct macro-
economic imbalances. The EIP procedure will fill a
gap in the surveillance of macroeconomic policies in
the EU. It will have a broad scope and encompass
both external imbalances, including competitiveness
trends, and internal imbalances. Its design builds on
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 SURPLUS VS. DEFICIT MEMBER STATES
% of GDP
Surplus countries: BE, DK, DE, LU, NL, AT, FI and SE
Deficit countries: the rest of the EU                                    
Figure 9
7 In Ireland, in particular, despite revers-
ing the current account deficit to a sur-
plus, the net international investment
position in 2009 deteriorated (– 98 percent
of GDP from 72 percent of GDP) due to
a dramatic fall in GDP.
8 For example, in the framework of the
Commission services’ review of competi-
tiveness developments and imbalances,
the informal surveillance in the Eurogroup
as well as assessments in the context of the
SGP and the Lisbon strategy. An overview
of the Commission’s analysis can be found
in European Commission (2010b).CESifo Forum 2/2011 9
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the experiences from the recent
crisis; it is however flexible
enough to take on board new
trends and developments as
potential future crises can have
different origins.9
The strong financial interlink-
ages in the euro area and the fail-
ure of financial markets to allo-
cate savings efficiently underline
the need to monitor both high
external deficits as well as sur-
pluses. Clearly, the urgency and
extent of the desirable policy
action will differ with deficit
countries facing far greater chal-
lenges. Sustainable adjustment to
current account imbalances re  -
quires significant improvements
in price/cost and non-price competitiveness in deficit
countries and considerable reversions in their struc-
ture towards the tradable sector. On the side of sur-
plus countries, further efforts are needed to remove
structural impediments to private sector demand and,
particularly, investment. The emphasis thus needs to
be on structural measures that would support con-
strained domestic demand. Adjustments in current
account surpluses should not be pursued through
engineering fiscal expansions or unjustified increases
in salaries. It is encouraging that the economic pick
up, especially in Germany, is to an important degree
driven by improvements in domestic demand.
Nevertheless, further structural measures are warrant-
ed to sustain this favourable rebalancing of sources of
growth.
These directions are also embedded in the European
Commission’s proposal for a package of country-spe-
cific recommendations which was published in early
June as part of the first European semester cycle. The
recommendations aim at reducing imbalances in both
deficit and surplus countries, with a broader set of
measures of often greater intensity suggested to
deficit countries. 
The EIP surveillance will be complementary with the
work of the ESRB in the areas of common focus such
as financial markets or credit developments.
Particularly, the relevant recommendations made by
the ESRB will be taken into account in the EIP, so to
strengthen their enforceability. The possibility of the
ESRB to address recommendations to a wider set of
actors, including private sector ones, will complement
the EIP’s outreach which is limited to national gov-
ernments.
How the EIP will work
The procedure will have two key elements: (i) ‘a pre-
ventive arm’, focused on the early detection of macro-
economic imbalances through a regular monitoring
and assessment; and (ii) ‘a corrective arm’, which
kicks in when harmful imbalances are identified
(Figure 10).
The preventive arm starts with an ‘alert mechanism’
to identify member states with potentially problemat-
ic levels of macroeconomic imbalances. The alert
mechanism includes a scoreboard of forward looking
indicators, which combined with an economic reading
of results by the Commission services, could provide
an early-warning of the emergence of potential imbal-
ances. The aim of the alert mechanism is to identify
those member states where ‘in-depth’ study is required
to determine whether an imbalance is problematic or
benign. It is the in-depth study, and not the score-
board/alert mechanism, which is the central feature of
the preventive arm of the EIP and which will be basis
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9 Francesco Giavazzi and Luigi Spaventa in their VoxEU column
entitled ‘The European Commission’s Proposals: Empty and
Useless’ argued that monitoring should focus exclusively on credit
growth and policy action should concentrate on financial markets as
they see unchecked credit expansions to be the main culprits of past
imbalances. The analysis in the previous section shows that this
would be too narrow a view. While credit conditions surely played a
crucial role, other factors such as losses in competitiveness or
declines in export shares were also important. Hence, the broad
scope is warranted to capture the variety of specific country situa-
tions in the EU and euro area.for any policy recommendations
addressed to member states.
If the ‘in-depth’ study concludes
that the imbalances are ‘exces-
sive’ in that they are severe or
jeopardising the functioning of
EMU, the ‘corrective arm’ of the
process will be activated and the
member state concerned will be
subject to an ‘Excessive Im  -
balance Procedure’ (EIP). This
will involve stepped-up surveil-
lance centred around a remedial
action plan put forward by the
member state in response to
more prescriptive country-spe  -
cific policy recommendations
issued by the Council. The action
plan should detail the policy
responses and their calendar and be agreed by the
Commission and Council as an, ex-ante, sufficient
policy response if well implemented. Strict progress
reporting and implementation monitoring will
accompany the process to ensure follow up. 
In addition, if a euro area member fails repeatedly to
act in compliance with the agreed action plan (or to
put forward a sufficient plan) it will be subject to year-
ly financial sanctions until the Council establishes
that corrective action has been taken. If credibly
enforced, the possibility to impose sanctions will be a
crucial element. An important feature is that such
sanctions should be voted, in the Council, with a
reverse qualified majority. Unless a qualified majority
is against, the sanctions will apply automatically. This
major shift, which also applies to the proposed
reforms to the SGP, will address one of the most
widely criticised shortcomings of the existing surveil-
lance arrangements.
The analytical challenge
The surveillance on imbalances and competitiveness
poses analytical challenges (see Figure 11). In partic-
ular, it is key to distinguish between benign and harm-
ful macroeconomic trends, and to identify possible
policy responses, both to prevent emergence of exces-
sive imbalances and facilitate their correction once
they arise.
When trying to distinguish between harmful and
benign macroeconomic developments, there is a need
to link them to underlying policy mistakes and/or
market failures. Importantly, country specific features
(and possible distortions) of the goods and labour
markets, the asset markets (including real estate) and
the financial sector need to be taken account of. To
this end, it may be useful to consider (i) the sustain-
ability of macroeconomic developments (e.g. by using a
range of methods to analyse the policy determinants
of imbalances and to measure deviations from esti-
mates of dynamic equilibrium positions); (ii) the coun-
try's adjustment capacity (a persistent accumulation of
external debt, for instance, should be qualified more
rapidly as an imbalance if the adjustment capacity is
low and its correction is therefore likely to be pro-
tracted and costly); and (iii) the spillovers to other EU
member states (an imbalance is more likely to be clas-
sified as harmful to the functioning of EMU if its
unwinding can generate strong knock-on effects on
other member states).
A wide range of policies are relevant in addressing the
issue of imbalances, including fiscal policies, financial
market regulation or structural reforms. The latter
increase the flexibility of product and labour markets
and are thus essential both for the prevention and cor-
rection of imbalances. First, well-functioning markets
help prevent inappropriate wage and price responses
to country-specific shocks. Second, they also facilitate
adjustment processes through the required changes in
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ANALYTICAL CHALLENGES IN ASSESSING MACROECONOMIC IMBALANCES
Source: European Commission.
Figure 11
10 See, for instance, the indicator-based assessment framework (LAF)
which allows for benchmarking of member states’ performance in 20
policy areas spanning labour markets, product markets and the domain
of knowledge and innovation. Link: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_
finance/db_indicators/laf/index_en.htm.CESifo Forum 2/2011 11
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relative prices and wages together with a smooth real-
location of labour and capital in the economy.
Evidence indicates that despite some progress there is
still considerable room for improvements in the func-
tioning of labour and product markets.10
Conclusions
The proposed legislation on preventing and correcting
harmful imbalances will fill a major gap in macroeco-
nomic surveillance at the EU level. However, success
needs to be earned and the next challenge will be to
ensure that the framework is applied effectively in
practice. Part of that will be to overcome some of the
political-economy constraints that hampered the pol-
icy coordination processes in the past. The enforce-
ment capacity of surveillance tools, such as the SGP,
proved to be limited as short-term political reasoning
prevailed over long-term interest of the EU and the
euro area as a whole. It is, therefore, important that
the procedure has appropriate incentive structures
built in and that there is a wide political buy-in.
In this respect, it is also important to recall the over-
arching objective of the exercise, namely to ensure
smooth functioning of EMU. This not only requires
sufficient adjustment capacity in our economies to
deal with shocks but also keeping the imbalances and
competitiveness divergences in the euro area under
control. To achieve this, there should be contributions
from both countries with large current account deficit
as well as countries with large surpluses. Without
doubt, the degree of urgency to act, and also the
depth of necessary policy responses, is considerably
bigger for deficit countries due to their vulnerability
to changes in market sentiments and the risk of nega-
tive spillovers to other countries. Nevertheless, to the
extent that there are important domestic market and
policy failures in surplus countries these should also
be addressed. Therefore, in the case of surplus coun-
tries, action needs to focus on structural reforms
which boost productivity and release pent up demand.
Policy measures aiming at reducing surpluses through
expansions of fiscal policy or leading to competitive-
ness losses such as unwarranted increases in salaries
would clearly not be useful nor desirable.
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